PKI-Based Security For P2P Information Sharing

By

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Introduction

- Present some of the issues with securing dynamic collaborations in environments where resources and users can cross many trust boundaries.
- Propose solutions and show how they are being used in a P2P file sharing application called scishare.

Traditional Security Model

- Authorized users are predefined.
 - In or out
 - Harder to meet 'new people' online in a collaboration.
- Policies are managed by third party entities (administrators).
 - Hard to start a spontaneous collaboration
 - Setup takes time
 - Hard to invite a person to an established collaboration
 - Must contact resource administrators
 - Admins have all the power
- Security becomes a nuisance.
 - Users may resort to un-secure solutions


A More Flexible Security Model

- Partition the collaboration into two types of secure components:
 - Public
 - Capture users' identities
 - Gradual trust in the collaboration
 - Turn off public components
 - Protected
 - Authorized users only
 - Give invitation/escort powers to some of these users
- Example of components:
 - Communication channels, online instruments, chat rooms, shared spaces, files, ...

Approach

- Use Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
 - X509 certification/online CAs
 - Flexible Trust Models
 - Reduces Key Management issues
- Use existing PKI-based security technologies
 - Modifications are external
 - Reduce the risk of introducing security holes

Scishare Architecture



Components In Scishare

- Unicast channels
 - Managed by the users participating in the communication
- Multicast channel
 - Managed by 'Third-Party administrators'
- Files and metadata
 - Managed by individual users

Background

- SSL on top of TCP
 - Confidentiality, integrity, authentication
 - Servers 'must have' X509 certificates
 - P2P: Every peer plays the role of a server
- SGL on top IGP
 - IGP: decentralized 'TCP like' group protocol
 - SGL: decentralized 'SSL-like' group protocol
- Akenti authorization system
 - Capability certificate (resource, user, rights)
 - Push model

Securing Unicast

- Every user can start/connect to a secure server
 - Provide users with pseudo X509 certificates if they don't have any.
 - Trust Managers
 - Accept any valid chain
 - Add un-trusted users to a list accessible by users
 - Users can authorize un-trusted users based on experiences.
 - A single channel can handle both protected and public traffic.
 - Simplifies development


Securing Multicast

- Public group communication channel.
 - Every user can join
- Protected group communication channel.
 - Fine-grained access control
 - Join, invite, escort
 - Capabilities
 - Short lived, signed by the enforcers
 - Invitations/Escorts
 - Short lived, signed by authorized users
- A single communication channel.
 - A protected SGL layer over a public one


Securing Files and Metadata


- Group-based access control
 - Provide a simple high level interface to users
 - Akenti is used underneath
 - Distributed groups
 - User revocation
 - Future complex expressions
 - Time of day, …

Manage CAs




Manage User Identity







Manage Policies

Manage Groups










Search - Transfer

- Start a search.
- Display the origin of the metadata and its trustworthiness
- Display the origin of the file and its trustworthiness



Future Directions

- Message level security
 - SOAP
- Grid Security Model
 - Virtual organizations
 - X509 proxy certificates/Delegation
 - X509 attribute certificates

Conclusion

- Simple ideas to make secure online collaborations more successful.
- Did not invent any new technology.
- Scishare is out there and every week we are improving it.
- http://www.dsd.lbl.gov